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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fair Housing Act ("FHA"),1 enacted in 1968 and amended in
1988, is an attempt by Congress to ensure that citizens of the
United States have the opportunity to obtain housing on a nondis-
criminatory basis. 2 Though the purpose of the FHA is clear, dis-
sension exists among the circuit courts of the United States re-
garding the extent of protections provided therein. In particular,
there has been a significant difference among the circuits as to the
appropriate standard by which to evaluate facially discriminatory
statutes that fall within the reach of the FHA. The purpose of this
comment is to address the proper standard and to illustrate the
need for consistency across the circuits. As a means to this end,
this comment will discuss the terms and purpose of the FHA, the
individual approaches of each circuit addressing the issue, and
assess those approaches in an attempt to discern a satisfactory
uniform standard.
The issue of what standard ought to apply to facially discrimi-
natory statutes falling within the scope of the FHA is one of mod-
ern relevance. Given the numerous groups protected under the
FHA, it has proven inevitable that one or more of these groups
will be affected by legislation, regulations, or ordinances govern-
ing the housing opportunities available to them. For example, a




recent case decided in the Southern District of New York, Sierra v.
City of New York, 3 involved a housing code provision that forbade
children under the age of sixteen from living in single-room occu-
pancy units that lacked kitchen or sanitary facilities. 4 The provi-
sion was facially discriminatory, as it differentiated on the basis of
familial status. As the state of the law presently stands, the valid-
ity of that provision would depend on what approach the court
would choose to adopt regarding facially discriminatory statutes
under the FHA.
Because several circuits are split on the issue of what standard
ought to apply, individuals similarly situated but residing in dif-
ferent jurisdictions would not likely achieve the same result in a
challenge to a law impinging on their fair housing rights. When a
member of a group protected by the FHA challenges a facially dis-
criminatory statute, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applies
the standard of scrutiny afforded to that particular group under
equal protection analysis.5 Under this approach, individuals of
differing groups will receive varying levels of protection under the
FHA. For example, if a zoning ordinance differentiated on the
basis of race, the strict scrutiny standard would apply, and the
ordinance would likely be deemed unlawful. 6 In contrast, a zoning
ordinance differentiating on the basis of familial status, such as
that challenged in Sierra, would merit application of the rational
basis standard, and the court would likely give deference to the
legislative body. 7 This approach is problematic, as classes of per-
sons protected collectively under the FHA are treated differently
on the basis of their particular class.
Comparatively, under the approaches of the Sixth, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals, a challenged facially discrimina-
tory statute would be evaluated under a more consistent and indi-
vidual-centered approach.8 Under this approach, the primary cri-
teria for validity under the FHA is whether the facially discrimi-
natory statute differentiates on the basis of the unique character-
istics and needs of, and concerns regarding the group affected. 9
3. 552 F. Supp. 2d 428 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
4. Sierra, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 429.
5. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
6. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179.
7. Sierra, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 430.
8. See Larkin v. State of Mich. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285 (6th Cir. 1996);
Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1995); Cmty. House, Inc. v. City of
Boise, 490 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
9. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503-04.
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This approach is at once more uniform and more flexible than the
approach of the Eighth Circuit, as the same standard applies to all
groups protected under the FHA, while also allowing regulations
or restrictions tailored to the individuals actually affected. This
comment will elaborate on the positive aspects of the approach of
the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and propose that this ap-
proach be adopted uniformly across the circuits so that the FHA is
consistently applied throughout the courts of this nation.
II. EIGHTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS: MIRRORING EQUAL PRO-
TECTION ANALYSIS
Of the two principal approaches to the treatment of facially dis-
criminatory statutes under the FHA, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals approach gives greater deference to the legislature and
tends to uphold more challenged statutes. The Eighth Circuit set
forth the parameters of its approach to discriminatory statutes
under the FHA in United States v. City of Black Jack.10 In that
case, the complaint alleged that the City of Black Jack, Missouri
violated the FHA by enacting a zoning ordinance that prohibited
multiple family dwellings in a particular area of town, preventing
the building of integrated housing for low- to moderate-income
citizens." The ordinance was alleged to be discriminatory; its
purported aim and expected effect was to maintain the racial com-
position of the City of Black Jack, which was "virtually all
white."'
2
The Eighth Circuit looked to the purposes of the FHA: "[t]o
provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States"'13 and to aid determination of the
proper response to discriminatory housing statutes.' 4 The court
further considered the fact that the FHA was enacted to aid en-
forcement of the Thirteenth Amendment, eliminating remnants of
slavery, 15 and that it was intended to prohibit "all forms of dis-
crimination, sophisticated as well as simple-minded."' 6 Likening
housing discrimination to employment discrimination, the court
10. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179.
11. Id. at 1182.
12. Id. at 1183.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
14. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184.
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 826 (8th Cir. 1974)).
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declared barriers that function to discriminate on the basis of an
impermissible classification must be eradicated. 17
The Eighth Circuit announced that the burden of proof in cases
challenging statutes as facially discriminatory under the FHA is
the "prima facie case"18 set forth in Williams v. Matthews Co.' 9
The plaintiff must show that "the conduct of the defendant actu-
ally or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words,
that it has a discriminatory effect."20 Once the plaintiff has estab-
lished discriminatory effect, "the burden then shifts to the gov-
ernmental defendant to demonstrate that its conduct was neces-
sary to promote a compelling government interest."21 The court
concluded that the zoning ordinance was impermissibly discrimi-
natory, as it disproportionately affected blacks, confining them to
living in the inner city of Saint Louis, and that the ordinance did
not further any asserted governmental interest.2
2
In Black Jack, the Eighth Circuit set forth its approach to ra-
cially discriminatory statutes under the FHA: the plaintiff must
show a prima facie case of discriminatory effect, and in response,
the government must show that its action was necessary to serve
a compelling public interest.23 Worth noting is that Black Jack
dealt only with a racially discriminatory ordinance--one that, if
evaluated on constitutional grounds, would likely be struck down
under strict scrutiny analysis. 24 The FHA extends protection to
several other groups of persons, including some who do not merit
strict scrutiny under a Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
17. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184 (referencing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
430-31 (1971)).
18. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1184.
19. 499 F.2d at 826.
20. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185. The court asserted that effect, rather than motiva-
tion, was the pertinent characteristic, because motives may be hidden. Id. (citing Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967)).
21. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185.
22. Id. at 1186-87. The asserted governmental interests were: (1) Road and traffic
control; (2) Prevention of overcrowding of schools; (3) Prevention of devaluation of adjacent
single-family homes. Id. at 1186. The court stated that in determining whether an as-
serted interest was compelling, three factors must be considered:
[F]irst, whether the ordinance in fact furthers the governmental interest asserted;
second, public interest served by the ordinance is constitutionally permissible and is
substantial enough to outweight [sic] the private detriment caused by it; and third,
whether less drastic means are available whereby the stated government interest
may be attained.
Id. at 1186-87. The court found it unnecessary to evaluate beyond the first factor, as it
found none of the asserted interests to be furthered by the ordinance. Id. at 1187.
23. Id. at 1184-85.
24. Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1183-84.
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analysis. While adopting an approach to racially discriminatory
statutes under the FHA in Black Jack, the Eighth Circuit was not
altogether clear what would result when a group alleging dis-
crimination did not merit constitutional strict scrutiny.
In Familystyle of St. Paul, Inc. v. City of St. Paul,25 the Eighth
Circuit answered the question of what standard ought to apply to
statutes under the FHA which are alleged to be discriminatory on
other than racial grounds. In Familystyle, the Eighth Circuit
evaluated the validity of a Minnesota law requiring residential
facilities for the mentally ill to be placed at least a quarter of a
mile from one another. 26 The stated purpose of that requirement
was to provide for deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill.27 The
court distinguished Black Jack, stating that once a plaintiff has
presented a prima facie case of the discriminatory effect of the
challenged law, "the burden shifts to the governmental defendant
to demonstrate that its conduct was necessary to promote a gov-
ernmental interest commensurate with the level of scrutiny af-
forded the class of people affected by the law under the [E]qual
[P]rotection [C]lause. ''28 The court concluded that the rational ba-
sis test set forth in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center
29
was the appropriate standard to use in evaluating the validity of a
law distinguishing the mentally handicapped.
30
In Cleburne, the Supreme Court declared that those afflicted by
mental retardation do not constitute a suspect class for equal pro-
tection purposes.3 1 Because the mentally retarded are not a sus-
pect class, the validity of the law hinges on whether the distinc-
tion between the mentally impaired and others is "rationally re-
lated to a legitimate governmental purpose. ' 32 The Eighth Circuit
concluded that deinstitutionalization of the mentally handicapped
was a legitimate government purpose and that the law was valid
under the FHA.33
Familystyle set forth the Eighth Circuit's approach to facially
discriminatory statutes under the FHA. Following Equal Protec-
tion Clause jurisprudence, the court determined that whatever
25. 923 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1991).
26. Familystyle, 923 F.2d at 92-93.
27. Id. at 93.
28. Id. at 94 (citing Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185 n.4).
29. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
30. Familystyle, 923 F.2d at 94.
31. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 433.
32. Id.
33. Familystyle, 923 F.2d at 94-95.
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standard of scrutiny applies to an affected group under equal pro-
tection jurisprudence will be used in FHA evaluations of facially
discriminatory laws affecting that group.34 The Eighth Circuit
utilized this approach again in Oxford House-C v. City of St.
Louis.35 Oxford House, which ran group homes for recovering al-
coholics and drug addicts, challenged a Missouri zoning ordinance
that limited the number of unrelated residents in group homes for
the handicapped. 36 Oxford House alleged that the ordinance dis-
criminated against the residents, obstructing their fair housing
rights.37 The Eighth Circuit declared that, even if the ordinance
caused some financial hardship on the homes-and thereby their
handicapped residents-, the ordinance was lawful so long as an
underlying rational basis existed. 38 The court found that the gov-
ernment had a legitimate interest in reducing traffic, congestion,
and noise in residential areas and that the ordinance was rea-
sonably related to that purpose.
39
III. SIXTH, NINTH, AND TENTH CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS: A
MORE PARTICULARIZED STANDARD
In contrast to the Eighth Circuit's approach to discriminatory
statutes under the FHA, which mirrors equal protection jurispru-
dence in its application of the standard of scrutiny to be accorded
to a particular affected group, the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits each take an approach that is more protective of a plaintiffs
fair housing rights. The more protective approach rejects the no-
tion of applying an equal protection analysis to challenged stat-
utes under the FHA. Instead, the courts apply a consistent stan-
dard to discriminatory statutes under the FHA: the statutes must
be tailored to the actual situations of the particular groups af-
fected.
40
34. Id. at 94.
35. 77 F.3d 249 (8th Cir. 1996).
36. Oxford House, 77 F.3d at 250-51.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 252.
39. Id.
40. See Larkin, 89 F.3d at 290 (Any discriminatory statute enacted under the FHA
must be "warranted by the unique and specific needs and abilities of those handicapped
persons affected."); Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503 (Any discrimination against handicapped,
made under the FHA, in the name of public safety "must be tailored to particularized con-
cerns about individual residents."); Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1050 (discriminatory treat-
ment under the FHA must be predicated on the actual situations of the affected persons).
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In Bangerter v. Orem City Corporation,41 the Tenth Circuit re-
jected the use of an equal protection analysis to assess FHA
claims. 42 The case involved a challenge to a zoning ordinance re-
quiring group homes for the mentally handicapped located in "sin-
gle family" residential areas to obtain a conditional use permit.
43
The court, making an analogy to employment discrimination
cases, looked to the Supreme Court's decision in International Un-
ion, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, UAW v. Johnson Controls44 to establish that
the ordinance could be deemed discriminatory based on its terms
alone, without regard to the underlying government intent or in-
terest.45 Rejecting the application of an equal protection analysis,
the Tenth Circuit stated that the plaintiffs ability to assert a right
under the Fourteenth Amendment is irrelevant in an FHA claim
because the mentally handicapped are a protected class under the
FHA, even if they are not protected for Fourteenth Amendment
purposes.
46
The Tenth Circuit looked first to the actual language of the
FHA.47 The court referenced Section 3604(f)(9) of the Act, which
specifies that the Act does not require housing to be made avail-
able to an individual when that person's tenancy would pose a risk
to public safety. 48 While the Act does allow for discriminatory
housing statutes in the interest of public safety, there are limita-
tions.49 The court asserted that any discrimination against the
handicapped in the name of public safety "must be tailored to par-
ticularized concerns about individual residents" 50 and cannot be
based on generalizations or stereotypes about the handicapped.
51
Furthermore, while the FHA does not preclude housing restric-
tions that benefit, rather than discriminate against, the dis-
41. Bangerter, 46 F.3d 1491.
42. Id. at 1500, 1503.
43. Id. at 1496.
44. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
45. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1500-01.
46. Id. at 1503.
47. Id. at 1503-04.
48. Id. at 1503. Section 3604(f)(9) of the FHA states "[niothing in this subsection re-
quires that a dwelling be made available to an individual whose tenancy would constitute a
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals or whose tenancy would result in
substantial physical damage to the property of others." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(9) (2006).





abled, 52 the court was wary of accepting such a justification for a
discriminatory statute.53 The court concluded by declaring, "re-
strictions that are narrowly tailored to the particular individuals
affected could be acceptable under the [FHA] if the benefit to the
handicapped in their housing opportunities clearly outweigh
whatever burden may result to them."
54
The Sixth Circuit adopted a very similar approach in Larkin v.
Michigan Department of Social Services.55 Larkin involved a chal-
lenge to the spacing and notice requirements of the Michigan
Adult Foster Care Facility Licensing Act.56 The Sixth Circuit
stated that, because the statute was facially discriminatory, the
burden shifted to the defendant to establish its legitimacy.57 In
determining the magnitude of the burden on the defendant, the
Sixth Circuit referenced both the Eighth Circuit's approach in
Familystyle and Oxford House and the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Bangerter.58 Looking to a prior decision that safety restrictions on
homes for the handicapped "must be tailored to the particular
needs" of those individuals affected, 59 the Sixth Circuit required
facially discriminatory statutes under the FHA to be "warranted
by the unique and specific needs and abilities of those handi-
capped persons to whom the regulations apply,"60 a standard simi-
lar to that adopted by the Tenth Circuit.
52. Id. at 1504. The Tenth Circuit looks to Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding
the Title VII bar on racial discrimination, in which the Court considered the legislative and
historical background of Title VII and determined that affirmative action benefitting mi-
norities is permissible. Id. (citing United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193 (1979)).
53. Id.
54. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1504. To support this position, the court looks to decisions of
other circuits in the intentional racial discrimination setting in which the courts upheld
housing policies that made traditionally black housing more available to whites, thus re-
ducing the availability of such housing to blacks. Id. at 1505 (citing South-Suburban Hous.
Ctr, v. Greater S. Suburban Bd. of Realtors, 935 F.2d 868 (7th Cir. 1991) and Otero v. New
York City Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2nd Cir. 1973)). The court emphasized the impor-
tance of allowing for limited restrictions on minority housing to achieve the greater policies
of the FHA, including integration. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1505.
55. Larkin, 89 F.3d 285.
56. Id. at 287. The Act sought to prevent an "excessive concentration" of such facilities
in a municipality. Id. It prohibited the grant of a license to a proposed adult foster care
facility if another such facility was located within a 1500 foot radius. Id. It further re-
quired notice to a designated agency of the proposed location of an adult foster care facility
so that residents in the surrounding area could be notified. Id. The Michigan Adult Foster
Care Facility Licensing Act is codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §§400.701 et seq.
57. Larkin, 89 F.3d at 290.
58. Id..
59. Id. (citing Marburnak, 974 F.2d at 47).
60. Larkin, 89 F.3d at 290.
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In 2007, in Community House, Inc. v. City of Boise,61 the Ninth
Circuit followed the lead of the Sixth and Tenth Circuits and
adopted an approach to facially discriminatory statutes under the
FHA that required the statute to either benefit the protected class
or to respond to legitimate safety concerns based on the individu-
als involved, rather than being based on stereotypes. 62 The court
relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Con-
trols,63 an employment discrimination case in which the Court de-
clared that an employment policy discriminating on the basis of
religion, sex, or national origin could only pass muster if such a
quality was a "bona fide occupational qualification."64 Applying
the Johnson Controls approach, the Ninth Circuit concluded that,
while statutes could treat FHA-protected classes differently, such
treatment must be predicated on the actual situation of those af-
fected.
65
In their decisions regarding discriminatory statutes under the
FHA, the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth circuits each analogize the chal-
lenged statutes to employment discrimination actions brought un-
der Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,66 each looking to the
Supreme Court's decision in Johnson Controls.67 In Johnson Con-
trols, the Supreme Court determined that the issue of whether an
employment practice is discriminatory depends not on the under-
lying intent, but on the actual and explicit terms of the policy. 68
The Court stated, "...the absence of a malevolent motive does not
convert a facially discriminatory policy into a neutral policy with a
discriminatory effect."69  By adopting the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to employment discrimination cases in the context of dis-
criminatory statutes under the FHA, the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth
61. 490 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2007).
62. Id. at 1050.
63. 499 U.S. 187.
64. Id. at 200. A bona fide occupational qualification was defined as one "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." Id.
65. Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1050.
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1980-2000 (2006).
67. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187. See Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1503 (citing Supreme
Court's assertion that, in the employment discrimination context, whether a practice is
discriminatory centers on the actual terms of the practice, not the intent of the employer);
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199; Larkin, 89 F.3d at 289 (referencing the Tenth Circuit's
adoption of the Supreme Court's Johnson Controls approach to discriminatory practices);
Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at 1049-50 (citing the position of the Supreme Court in Johnson
Controls that the legitimacy of discriminatory treatment in the employment context will be
determined by the explicit terms of the discrimination, not the employer's intent).




Circuits refuse to consider the motive or purpose of a law, thus
precluding application of standards promulgated under equal pro-
tection analysis. 70 The sole factor in determining whether a stat-
ute is discriminatory is the terms of the statute itself.
7 1
IV. THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT COURT OF NEW YORK ADOPTED THE
APPROACH OF THE SIXTH, NINTH, AND TENTH CIRCUIT COURTS OF
APPEALS
As previously mentioned, the Southern District of New York re-
cently considered a case challenging a housing code provision as
facially discriminatory under the FHA. In Sierra v. New York,
7 2
the plaintiff was evicted from her single-room occupancy unit (a
unit lacking a kitchen, restroom) on the basis of a housing code
provision prohibiting children under the age of sixteen from living
in such units.73 The court assessed the approaches of the various
circuits.7 4 Rejecting the Eighth Circuit's approach, the court
claimed that application of rational basis scrutiny75 is typically
reserved for situations in which state law is alleged to violate
more general provisions of the Constitution, like the Fourteenth
Amendment.7 6 Where Congress has formulated a specific provi-
sion to protect a particular class, however, the court asserted that
a heightened standard is necessary to ensure the class receives
the protection Congress intended.77 The appropriate standard to
be applied, the court claimed, was the standard set forth by the
Second Circuit in Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Hunt-
ington,78 which requires the defendant to show a genuine govern-
ment interest that cannot be served by a less discriminatory
means.7 9 The Southern District of New York believed that stan-
dard to be a broader statement of the standard set forth by the
70. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1500-01; Larkin, 89 F.3d at 290; Cmty. House, 490 F.3d at
1049-50.
71. Bangerter, 46 F.3d at 1500-01.
72. . Sierra, 552 F. Supp. 2d 428.
73. Id. at 429.
74. Id. at 430-31.
75. Id at 430. The Southern District of New York discusses the approach of the Eighth
Circuit solely in terms of the rational basis standard. Id. Each of the cases cited by the
Southern District of New York with regard to the Eighth Circuit is one in which the Eighth
Circuit applied the rational basis test. Id. It should be reiterated, however, that the
Eighth Circuit's approach is most accurately stated as set forth in Black Jack.
76. Id.
77. Sierra, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 430-31.
78. 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988). Huntington was a case addressing the independent
issue of disparate impact under the Fair Housing Act. Id.
79. Sierra, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 431 (citing Huntington, 844 F.2d at 936).
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Ninth Circuit in Community House.80 The district court held that
the Huntington standard was appropriate for the same reasons
asserted by the Ninth Circuit.
8 '
V. ANALYSIS
There are two general approaches to the standard to be applied
to facially discriminatory statutes falling within the scope of the
FHA. The Eighth Circuit approach mirrors Equal Protection
Clause analysis as to the level of scrutiny that should be applied.
82
The Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits each share a different ap-
proach, which provides a more consistent standard to the several
classes protected by the FHA and allows for more flexibility in
housing laws, restrictions, and benefits tailored to the actual
situations of those affected. As the following discussion indicates,
the approach of the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits is the more
appropriate standard to be applied to discriminatory statutes fal-
ling within the scope of the FHA.
The core problem of the Eighth Circuit's approach stems from
the use of standards promulgated under Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence, applying the level of scrutiny accorded to an af-
fected class under equal protection analysis. This approach tends
to prejudice parties challenging a housing law or regulation as
facially discriminatory in violation of the FHA. As applied by the
Eighth Circuit,8 3 a plaintiff challenging a housing law that is fa-
cially discriminatory on the basis of race is more likely to prevail
than a plaintiff challenging a law that discriminates on the basis
of handicap.
This result is illustrated by a comparison of the decisions ren-
dered by the Eighth Circuit in Black Jack and Familystyle. In
Black Jack, the plaintiffs challenged an ordinance that arguably
discriminated on the basis of race.8 4 Once the plaintiffs had estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination, the Eighth Circuit re-
quired the municipal defendant to show that the discriminatory
ordinance was necessary to serve a compelling public interest.
8 5
That standard placed a considerable burden on the defendant,
making it more likely that the plaintiff might prevail. Compara-
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Black Jack, 408 F.2d at 1185.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1181.
85. Id. at 1184-85.
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tively, the Eighth Circuit applied a rational basis level of scrutiny
in Familystyle, requiring only that the ordinance be rationally re-
lated to a legitimate government purpose when plaintiffs chal-
lenged an ordinance discriminating on the basis of handicap.8 6
The rational basis standard is easier to meet than the strict scru-
tiny standard. A law discriminating on the basis of handicap is
thus more likely to stand where a law discriminating on the basis
of race will be struck down.
This result is undesirable under the FHA for a variety of rea-
sons. One problem is that the levels of scrutiny promulgated un-
der the Equal Protection Clause are typically reserved for claims
of violations of the broad rights guaranteed by the Constitution.87
The rights to which citizens are entitled under the FHA are not
such "broad, general guarantees,"88 but are specific protections
granted by Congress to a particular group of citizens. Thus, the
FHA is an inappropriate context in which to apply the levels of
scrutiny used to protect broad constitutional guarantees.
Additionally, the Eighth Circuit's approach conflicts with Con-
gress's intent in enacting the FHA as evidenced by the plain lan-
guage of the statute. Congress included all of the protected
classes together in one statute.8 9 This action indicates its intent
that each protected class receives the same protection under the
Act, without significant differentiation between the protection
given to individual classes of protected persons. The handicapped
are not a traditionally "suspect class" under the Equal Protection
Clause and are not typically accorded any type of heightened scru-
tiny in the equal protection context. 90 If Congress had intended to
condition the degree of protection granted under the FHA on the
class of the injured party, it would have drafted the Act in such a
manner. Because it did not, the Eighth Circuit's choice to apply
varying levels of scrutiny-thereby according varying levels of
protection-is contrary to the intent of Congress.
A final problem with the Eighth Circuit's approach is the possi-
bility that, in many cases, it allows for a legislature or other rule-
making authority to avoid the stated purpose of the FHA. This
danger exists particularly for those classes not deemed "suspect
classes" under equal protection analysis, to whom the rational ba-
86. Familystyle, 923 F.2d at 92-93.
87. Sierra, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 430.
88. Id.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2006).
90. City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446.
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sis standard would apply. The rational basis standard, by its na-
ture, tends to give more deference to the legislature or rulemaking
authority, so long as a legitimate government purpose underlies
the legislation. A "legitimate government purpose" can be at-
tached to any law restricting the availability of housing to a group
protected under the FHA, and-so long as that restriction bears a
rational relation to that purported purpose-the restriction will
stand. As a result, the door is open for a lawmaking body to dis-
criminatorily restrict access to housing with relatively little judi-
cial inquiry into its effect.
This hazard is illustrated in the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Ox-
ford House.91 The court upheld a zoning ordinance that limited
group rehabilitative housing opportunities for recovering addicts.
92
The court expressed indifference to the fact that these group
homes would suffer extreme financial hardship as a result of the
restrictions of the zoning ordinance, stating that the ordinance
was not a violation of the FHA as long as the city had a rational
basis for enacting it.
93
This cavalier attitude toward the effect of the ordinance con-
flicts with the protective goal of the FHA. Under the approach
taken by the Eighth Circuit, a legislature has the ability to sys-
tematically discriminate against a protected class of persons and
limit the housing opportunities available to them, provided that a
rational basis for the restriction can be concocted. In a situation
like that in Oxford House, for example, a city could enact zoning
ordinances that make it so financially difficult for a group reha-
bilitative home to operate that no such homes could exist in the
community. The potential for such discrimination indicates that
the approach of the Eighth Circuit does not satisfactorily uphold
the protections of the FHA.
While the approach of the Eighth Circuit does not adequately
achieve the stated goal of the FHA, the "more searching scru-
tiny"94 approach of the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits does. It is
well-suited to furthering the goal of providing "for fair housing
throughout the United States."95 This approach requires that a
discriminatory housing restriction (1) either benefit the class af-
fected or be tailored to the actual needs of or concerns regarding
91. Oxford House, 77 F.3d 249.
91. Id. at 253.
93. Id.
94. Sierra, 552 F. Supp. 2d at 431.
95. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
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the individuals affected and (2) not be based on stereotypes of that
class. 96 At once both consistent and flexible, this approach most
accurately manifests Congress's intent underlying the FHA.
In contrast to the approach of the Eighth Circuit, the approach
of the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits provides a more consistent
standard of protection to all classes given protection under the
FHA. There is no distinction as to what level of protection will be
given based on the particular class of the challenging party. At
the same time, the approach is flexible enough that the outcome in
a particular case will be determined by the actual needs, concerns,
and characteristics of the individuals affected by the challenged
law. While all classes included in the FHA receive equal rights
and protection, those restrictions that are genuinely necessary in
a particular situation are likely to be upheld.
The flexibility of the standard combined with the prohibition on
restrictions based on stereotypes is another positive attribute of
the approach of the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. By seeking
to avoid the use of stereotypes, this approach makes a court more
likely to detect a false justification. As a result, only those restric-
tions that are merited by a particular class of persons in a particu-
lar situation will be upheld. The interests of those protected by
the FHA, as well as the members of the community at large are
furthered by this approach. People protected under the Act are
assured that their housing opportunities will not be unfairly lim-
ited on the basis of race, gender, handicap, familial status, etc.,
while the community at large may receive the benefit of restric-
tions that are necessary for the public good.
Of particular importance is that this approach permits facially
discriminatory statutes that benefit a protected class. While it is
necessary to be wary of any restriction seeking to be justified on
the ground that it benefits, rather than harms, the affected people,
it is equally important that those restrictions actually benefitting
a protected class be upheld. As previously noted, several courts
have made comparisons to employment discrimination cases in
discussing the FHA. In the employment discrimination context,
the Supreme Court has stated that Title VII's bar to racial dis-
crimination should not be read literally, but instead should be
read against the history of its enactment and interpreted to allow
affirmative action.97 By analogy, the FHA should therefore be
96. Cmty. House, 490 F.3d 1041.
97. United Steelworkers of Am. AFL-CIO-CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
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read as prohibiting discrimination intended to harm a protected
class, while at the same time permitting restrictions that are in-
tended to and actually do benefit them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuit approach allows for benefi-
cial restrictions to stand, yet ferrets out those restrictions claim-
ing to be beneficial but actually based on broad generalizations
and stereotypes. Furthermore, it offers a consistent standard, ap-
plied uniformly to all protected groups, yet provides for flexibility
in the evaluation of challenged laws. The aggregate effect of these
factors is that the preferred standard provides substantial protec-
tion to those groups protected under the FHA, while allowing leg-
islative bodies to create housing laws that meet the present needs
and concerns of their communities. For these reasons, the ap-
proach of the Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits should be the stan-
dard applied by all courts addressing facially discriminatory stat-
utes within the scope of the FHA.
Diane M. Pisani
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